Polygon Faces Proposal to Reassign 70.49 Million Frozen POL Through a Hard Fork

As of a November 5, 2026, report published at 9:00 p.m. Beijing time, Polygon faced a proposed change to account balances—not a routine release of frozen funds. Polymarket and Binance had proposed a Polygon PoS hard fork that would remove approximately 70.49 million POL from five addresses identified as attacker-controlled and credit the same amount to recovery addresses they designated. The proposal valued the POL at about $6.7 million; a later estimate in the report put it at roughly $6.5 million. The transfer had not been reported as approved or executed.

The proposal followed two security incidents reported on October 30. According to the report, Polygon validators froze four addresses associated with a Polymarket front-end compromise, holding 23.86 million POL, and one address associated with a Binance hot-wallet compromise, holding 46.63 million POL. Polymarket sought cooperation from the attackers but received no response. The proposal also alleged that attackers contacted Polygon validators and offered cash to unfreeze addresses; that allegation was attributed to the proposal, not independently established in the report.

What would the fork change? Freezing an address restricts transactions without changing its balance. The proposed hard fork would instead alter balances at the protocol level without the addresses’ private-key signatures. The amount removed and the amount credited would match, leaving the total POL supply unchanged. Polymarket and Binance said the measure would apply only to the addresses involved in these two incidents and should not become a general recovery mechanism.

The teams were scheduled to present the proposal at a Polygon protocol governance meeting at 10:30 p.m. Beijing time on November 5. At the time of the report, Polygon officials, meeting members and core developers had not publicly stated a position. The report said both companies had already fully compensated affected users; it offered no governance outcome.

Balance-changing forks have precedents, but not an automatic template. After The DAO exploit in 2016, Ethereum forked to route funds to a refund contract, a decision that split the community and led to Ethereum Classic. The report also cited Core Network’s November 2 announcement of a hard fork to recover 68,146,177.22 CORE following an October 31 unauthorized withdrawal. Whether Polygon would accept a comparable intervention remained an open question at the November 5 reporting time.