Ethereum developers weigh Glamsterdam changes over smart-contract compatibility

For developers maintaining Ethereum smart contracts, the unresolved question in the planned Glamsterdam upgrade is whether changes to gas pricing could break assumptions their contracts rely on. At an All Core Developers meeting discussed in a November 20, 2026 report, developers had not decided whether to keep the upgrade’s specifications or revise them to reduce compatibility risks.

Glamsterdam is a planned hard fork intended to increase Ethereum’s capacity and efficiency. The concerns center on gas-repricing proposals EIP-8037 and EIP-8038. Security firm ChainSecurity warned in October 2026 that the proposed changes could disrupt existing contracts and potentially expose them to exploitation. Developers subsequently postponed the Hoodi testnet fork that had been scheduled for October 26.

Researchers identified 13 real-world examples of potentially affected contracts in October. A November investigation examined eight invariants—properties a contract is expected to preserve—that the upgrade could disrupt. At the meeting, developers said the Ethereum Foundation, ChainSecurity and security firm Dedaub had collectively contacted at least 50 affected companies. Three projects were classified as high impact, with fixes completed or expected by mid-December; medium-impact projects reported timelines extending to January 10.

Ethereum developers weigh Glamsterdam changes over smart-contract compatibility

Changing the specifications is not a risk-free fix. “Every spec change could, again, break new invariants that we are not aware of breaking yet,” one developer warned at the meeting. Under the existing specifications, mainnet activation could occur as early as mid-January 2027. Developers said waiting until January to decide could move activation to late February or early March, or to April or May if modifications are adopted. No activation date or specification change had been settled as of the November 20 report.

Developers also discussed the scope of Hegotá, the planned hard fork after Glamsterdam. They considered deferring some proposals to prioritize post-quantum cryptography, though several argued that a narrower scope would help little unless it also shortened the rollout. A preliminary review of EIP-8151, a proposal intended to protect accounts migrating to post-quantum security, identified a potentially large number of existing contracts that could be affected. No decision was reached on Hegotá’s scope; client teams were expected to submit their positions before further discussions in two weeks.